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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
Landon Johnson )    Docket No.  2017-08-0367 
 ) 
v. )    State File No. 94100-2016 
 ) 
Loomis Armored, et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Amber E. Luttrell, Judge ) 
 
Vacated and Remanded—Filed November 21, 2018 
 
The employee, a guard and driver for an armored truck company, alleged injuries to his 
neck and back as a result of his employment.  The employer initially provided workers’ 
compensation benefits but, upon receiving an opinion from the authorized physician that 
the injuries were not related to the employment, it denied the claim.  Following an 
expedited hearing, the trial court denied benefits based on a finding the employee was not 
likely to prevail at trial.  Subsequently, the employer filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  The trial court denied the motion on the basis the employee had not completed 
medical treatment and the parties were not subject to deadlines in a scheduling order.  
The employer has appealed.  We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for the 
trial court to address the merits of the employer’s motion. 
 
Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in 
which Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
 
R. Dale Thomas, Jackson, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Loomis Armored 
 
Landon Johnson, Memphis, Tennessee, employee-appellee, pro se 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
    
Landon Johnson (“Employee”) worked for Loomis Armored (“Employer”) as a 
guard and driver for its armored trucks.  He transported coins to and from banks in the 
Memphis area, which required him to load and unload the trucks with pallets of packaged 
coins.  Employee had various injuries prior to the one involved in this case that he 
believed were related to his work for Employer, including surgery on his back in 2015.  
FILED
Nov 21, 2018
01:00 PM(CT)
TENNESSEE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD
2 
 
As pertinent to this appeal, Employee alleges that on December 5, 2016, he injured his 
neck and back as he was loading a truck. 
 
Employer initially provided workers’ compensation benefits, including medical 
treatment with Dr. Fereidoon Parsioon.  After comparing MRI results from before and 
after the 2016 work incident, Dr. Parsioon opined that, except for changes related to 
Employee’s 2015 surgery, there were no anatomical changes in his back.  Thus, Dr. 
Parsioon believed Employee’s current complaints did not arise primarily out of the 
December 2016 incident.  Upon receiving this opinion, Employer denied the claim. 
 
Employee requested an expedited hearing at which Employer submitted medical 
records predating the 2016 injury, including records from three weeks before the alleged 
injury, documenting complaints virtually identical to those he reported after the incident 
involved here.  The trial court denied benefits, concluding Employee had not presented 
sufficient evidence to establish he would likely prevail at trial in proving he suffered an 
injury at work on December 5, 2016.  That order was not appealed. 
 
Thereafter, on June 14, 2018, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, 
asserting it had negated an essential element of Employee’s claim, i.e., causation.  
Employee filed a narrative response to Employer’s motion in the form of a letter, but did 
not file a response to Employer’s statement of undisputed facts as required by Rule 56 of 
the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.  The trial court denied Employer’s motion 
because Employee had not completed his medical treatment and because the parties were 
not subject to a scheduling order.  The court did not address the merits of the motion.  
Employer has appealed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is an issue of law and, 
therefore, our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness.  Rye v. 
Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); McBee v. 
CSX Transp., Inc., No. W2015-01253-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129, at *14 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2017).  As such, we must “make a fresh determination of 
whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have 
been satisfied.”  Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. 
 
Analysis 
 
A. 
 
The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Employer’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Employer asserts that it satisfied the requirements of 
Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and that Employee did not respond to 
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the motion as required by that rule.  In addition, Employer argues that, because Employee 
did not request a continuance or additional time to obtain medical proof, it was error for 
the trial court not to address the merits of its motion.  According to Employer, the trial 
court ignored the standard in Rule 56 for evaluating a motion for summary judgment and, 
instead, adopted two new requirements, i.e., an employee must have completed his or her 
medical treatment and the parties must have been subject to deadlines to obtain medical 
proof.  We agree with Employer that it was error for the trial court not to address the 
merits of Employer’s motion. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.  In evaluating a trial court’s 
decision to deny a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Arnold v. Courtyard Mgmt. Corp., No. 2015-
02266-SC-WCM-WC, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 648, at *7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Sept. 
28, 2016). 
 
When a party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial files a motion for 
summary judgment, it must do one of two things to prevail: (1) submit affirmative 
evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or (2) 
demonstrate that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential 
element of its claim.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 (2018); see also Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 
264.  If the moving party is successful in meeting this burden, the nonmoving party “may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading.”  Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265.  
Rather, the nonmoving party must respond by producing affidavits, pleadings, 
depositions, responses to interrogatories, or admissions that set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06; see also Rye, 477 
S.W.3d at 265.  If the nonmoving party fails to do so, “summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against the [nonmoving] party.”  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. 
 
In addition to these requirements, Rule 56.03 provides specific filing requirements 
for both the moving party and the nonmoving party.  The moving party must file a 
statement of undisputed material facts with its motion, ensuring that each fact is 
accompanied by a citation to the record.  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03.  Likewise, the 
nonmoving party is instructed to respond to this statement of undisputed facts, indicating 
it agrees the fact is undisputed or demonstrating that the fact is disputed by providing a 
citation to the record.  Id.  These requirements “are not mere suggestions.  The use of the 
words ‘must’ and ‘shall’ in Rule 56.03 to describe the necessary elements of a motion for 
summary judgment and any response thereto are plain and unambiguous.”  Thomas v. 
Zipp Express, No. 2015-06-0546, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 22, at *11 n.4 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 15, 2017). 
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Applying these principles to this case, we first note that, as Employer correctly 
points out, Employee neither responded to the motion for summary judgment in the 
manner required by Rule 56.06 nor requested additional time to obtain medical proof as 
contemplated by Rule 56.07.  However, these deficiencies are not determinative of this 
appeal, as the trial court did not render a decision based on Employee’s response, or lack 
thereof, to the motion.  Rather, the court found the motion was, essentially, not ripe for 
adjudication, a finding with which we cannot agree based on the circumstances presented. 
 
Specifically, the trial court concluded it would be “unjust” to rule on the merits of 
the motion because Employee had not completed his medical treatment and was not 
subject to deadlines in a scheduling order.  As support, the trial court cited Foriest v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 2017-06-0413, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 
39 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 10, 2018), which observed that “whether an 
injured worker is entitled to benefits depends on a variety of factors including, but not 
limited to, medical evidence.  Such evidence cannot be complete when the injured worker 
is still in the midst of pursuing a course of medical treatment.”  Id. at *7.  That case, 
however, involved a bifurcated trial at which the trial court was being asked to render a 
final decision on the compensability of the claim before the issue was ripe for 
adjudication.  Id. at *8.  Such is not the case here.  While the grant of a motion for 
summary judgment would amount to a final decision, it is not one based on the merits of 
the entirety of the parties’ proof as with a trial.  Rather, the court must determine whether 
there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute making a trial necessary at all, a 
distinctly different task from ruling on the ultimate merits of a claim. 
 
Moreover, we are unaware of any authority, and none has been cited to us, that 
would restrict motions for summary judgment to the time after an employee has 
completed medical treatment and after discovery or medical proof has been completed 
pursuant to a scheduling order.  To the contrary, Rule 56.02 expressly recognizes that “a 
party against whom a claim . . . is asserted” may “at any time, move . . . for a summary 
judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.”  (Emphasis added.)   
 
In addition, the regulations governing expedited hearings explicitly contemplate 
that, if the trial court declines to award benefits based on a finding the employee is not 
likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits, the employer may file a motion for summary 
judgment at that time.  Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.14(3) (2018).1  Thus, 
neither the language of Rule 56 nor the regulation permitting employers to request 
summary judgment after prevailing at an expedited hearing supports a refusal to address 
the merits of such a motion until after medical treatment has run its course and 
                                                 
1 Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.14(3) states: “[i]f, as a result of the expedited hearing, the claim is 
denied on the grounds of compensability, . . . [and] [i]f the denial on the grounds of compensability is 
affirmed by the appeals board or if no appeal is taken, the employer may file a motion for summary 
judgment . . . that meets the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.” 
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scheduling order deadlines have passed.  To the contrary, such an approach would be 
inconsistent with Rule 56 and the regulations. 
 
Further, requiring parties to wait until a case is, basically, ready for trial before a 
motion for summary judgment can be heard is inconsistent with the purpose of summary 
judgment.  As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court, summary judgment is 
designed to provide “a rapid and inexpensive means of resolving issues and cases about 
which there is no genuine issue regarding material facts.”  Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 261. 
 
However, we note that Rule 56 provides a mechanism to guard against premature 
grants of summary judgment.  Specifically, when the nonmoving party shows it “cannot 
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the opposition, the court 
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits 
to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just.”  Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07.  The purpose of this provision is to allow the 
parties a reasonable opportunity to proffer evidence in support of or in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment.  Denton v. Taylor, No. E2015-01726-COA-R3-CV, 2016 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 521, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2016).  If the circumstances are 
such that the nonmoving party needs more time to fairly oppose the motion, it is that 
party’s responsibility to state the reasons for a continuance.  Id. at *13 (“Both the 
language of Rule 56.07, and the appellate opinions construing it, state that an affidavit 
must be filed in support of a request for more time.”).  Here, Employee could have made 
such a request, and the trial court could have considered a continuance.  However, no 
such request was made, and the record is devoid of any explanation as to why, if at all, 
Employee was unable to obtain and present the material needed to properly oppose the 
motion.  Had such a reason existed, it was up to Employee to present it.  Id.  
 
B. 
 
We also address Employer’s argument that the circumstances of this case suggest 
the trial court abandoned its proper role as an unbiased decision maker and essentially 
became an advocate for one side.  According to Employer, the trial court provided what 
amounts to improper legal assistance to Employee when it declined to rule on the merits 
of the motion for summary judgment until Employee had completed his medical 
treatment and the parties had become subject to deadlines in a scheduling order.  
Employer asserts this action by the trial court effectively placed the court in the role of 
Employee’s advocate, a role which the court cannot assume. 
 
While it is true the trial court did not address the merits of the motion and denied it 
even though Employee had not requested more time as contemplated by Rule 56.07, we 
are not persuaded that these circumstances suggest the trial court abrogated its role as a 
neutral decision maker.  Rather, the court considered the circumstances under which the 
motion for summary judgment was made and rendered a decision that the case was not in 
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an appropriate posture to rule on the merits of the motion.  The mere fact that a judge 
renders an adverse ruling, even if the ruling was erroneous, is not sufficient, without 
more, to justify a finding that the judge improperly abandoned his or her role as a neutral 
factfinder.  See State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 308 (Tenn. 2008); Washington v. UPS 
Ground Freight, Inc., No. 2017-08-1205, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 41, at 
*12-13 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 2, 2018).  Thus, we see no merit in this 
issue. 
   
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to rule on the 
merits of Employer’s motion for summary judgment.  Accordingly, the court’s order 
denying the motion is vacated, and the case is remanded for the trial court to rule on the 
merits of the motion. 
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